feat(sandboxidentity): verify the identity of Chainloop sandboxes by javirln · Pull Request #3599 · chainloop-dev/chainloop

javirln · 2026-10-13T12:33:05Z

Context: PFM-7678. Design: Spec PFM-7678: Verified identity for Chainloop sandboxes, merged in chainloop-dev/platform#6875. It replaces D-009 of the commit verification spec (chainloop-dev/platform#6821). The platform side is chainloop-dev/platform#6861, which waits for a release with this change.

Today any CLI run can claim to be a Chainloop sandbox. So the platform cannot give a sandbox data that the attestation can trust. With this change, the platform gives each sandbox a signed identity token, and the CLI and the control plane verify it.

Identity token (R-001, R-003, D-006, D-013): the new sandboxidentity package defines it. It is a JWT signed with a new key for each sandbox. The x5c header holds a short-lived certificate from the control plane CA. The token names the organization, the project, the workflow, the sandbox run and the Chainloop token of the sandbox. It holds the commit verification of the attested commit. It has no expiry of its own: the control plane accepts it only with the Chainloop token that it names, and that token expires.
Only the platform can issue it (R-002, D-004, D-005): it needs the new permission sandbox_identity:create. A caller with this permission gets a certificate with a mark in its subject. No role holds the permission, and only a system API token can hold it. A CA that cannot write the mark gives no certificate.
The CLI verifies it (R-004, R-005, D-007, D-011): the CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX runner reads the token from the CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX_IDENTITY environment value. The CLI verifies the token against the trusted root of the control plane, in the same way as the attestation verify command. Only then is the runner authenticated, and only then does git.head record the commit verification. A token that does not verify gives a runner that is not authenticated and has no platform data. The CLI logs the reason.
The control plane enforces it (R-006, D-010, D-012): the CLI sends the token with the attestation init request. The control plane verifies it, accepts it only from the Chainloop token that it names, and records it on the workflow run. When the control plane stores an attestation of the sandbox runner, it rejects two cases. One is an authenticated runner without a verified identity. The other is a commit verification that the identity does not hold.

The attestation format does not change, and the other runners do not change.

Notes on the implementation:

The CLI does not know the organization ID, so it gives no organization to the expected values. The workflow ID comes from the init response of the control plane. The organization in the leaf certificate must be the organization in the claims. The control plane compares the organization, the project and the workflow. So R-003 holds.
The init response gets SandboxIdentityResult, which the spec does not name. The CLI authenticates the runner only when the control plane verified the identity and the verification of the CLI also passes. So the CLI and the control plane cannot disagree about the identity.
When the identity holds a signature algorithm, the control plane also compares it with the signature.algorithm of git.head.
The EJBCA CA writes the subject from the certificate request, so D-005 does not hold for it. The control plane fails closed. With EJBCA, it gives no certificate with the mark. With any CA, it rejects an issued certificate that has a mark that nobody requested. So an EJBCA deployment issues no identity, and its sandbox runner stays not authenticated, as today. The spec records this difference when the work ships.

This replaces the unsigned CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX_COMMIT_VERIFICATION value of the first version of this PR. No released CLI reads that value. CommitVerification keeps its JSON tags and status names, because the token carries the commit verification in that format.

AI disclosure: AI assisted with this change.

Assisted-by: Claude Code

chainloop-platform · 2026-10-13T12:33:16Z

AI Session Checks — 🟡 85% · ⚠️ 3 failing

Avg score	Sessions	Failing policies	Attribution	Files	Lines	Total Duration
🟡 85%	2	⚠️ 3	63% AI / 37% Human	41	+1331 / -116	76h36m15s

🟢 87% — 0% AI — ⚠️ 2 policies failing

Oct 9, 2026 06:24 UTC · 2h2m38s · $93.51 · 2.0k in / 602.2k out · claude-code 2.1.295 (claude-opus-5-5)

_{View session details ↗}

Change Summary

Adds server-side PR commit verification and passes the result into CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX.
Extends the sandbox runner and shared verification types/tests to consume the serialized result.
Exercises unit and end-to-end GitLab/GitHub flows, then opens a spec PR documenting the gap and design.

AI Session Overall Score

🟢 87% — Broad task landed cleanly; only the upfront planning remained under-documented.

AI Session Analysis Breakdown

🟢 93% · user-trust-signal

No notes.

🟢 92% · alignment

🟢 Later history and spec work started only after explicit follow-up asks. · High Impact

🟢 88% · scope-discipline

No notes.

🟢 88% · verification

🟢 It exercised failing tests, targeted suites, and GitLab/GitHub end-to-end paths. · High Impact

🟢 86% · solution-quality

🟢 The fix keeps commit verification server-side instead of leaking SCM tokens. · High Impact

🟡 68% · context-and-planning

🟠 Wide multi-repo work ran without a shared plan or TODO artifact, so setup stayed implicit. · Medium Severity

💡 Before cross-repo implementation and e2e setup, write a short plan naming phases, repos, and validation steps.

File Attribution

░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0% AI / 100% Human

Status	Attribution	File	Lines
modified	human	`backend/internal/biz/repo_source_test.go`	+79 / -0
created	human	`backend/internal/scm/gitlab/commit_verifier_test.go`	+76 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/prscan/task_test.go`	+72 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/testhelpers/mocks/registry.go`	+62 / -0
created	human	`backend/internal/scm/github/commit_verifier_test.go`	+59 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/biz/repo_source.go`	+40 / -0
created	human	`backend/internal/scm/github/commit_verifier.go`	+32 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/jobs/pr_scan.go`	+28 / -0
created	human	`backend/internal/scm/gitlab/commit_verifier.go`	+24 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/prscan/input.go`	+19 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/client.go`	+12 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/gitlab/client.go`	+9 / -2
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/registry.go`	+10 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/github/client.go`	+3 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/registry_test.go`	+3 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/github/provider.go`	+1 / -0
modified	human	`backend/internal/scm/gitlab/provider.go`	+1 / -0

Policies (5, 2 failing)

Status	Policy	Material	Messages
⚠️ Failed	`ai-session-no-auto-pr`	`ai-coding-session-0ebed9`	Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): cd /home/javi/orca/workspaces/platform/pfm-7678-spec && git push -q -u origin PFM-7678-spec-pr-attestation-commit-verification 2>&1 \| grep -v "^remote: *$" \| ta...
✅ Passed	`ai-config-ai-agents-allowed`	`ai-coding-session-0ebed9`	-
✅ Passed	`ai-config-no-dangerous-commands`	`ai-coding-session-0ebed9`	-
⚠️ Failed	`ai-config-no-secrets`	`ai-coding-session-0ebed9`	Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=30, source=tool_result, line=148]: 148 - Username: `[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]` Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=30, source=tool_result, line=149]: 149 - Password: `[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]` Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=30, source=tool_result, line=195]: 195 \| rustfs (optional) \| 9002 (API) 9003 (console) \| S3-compatible storage backend \| `[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]` / `[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]` \| Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=407, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=1]: L=/home/javi/orca/workspaces/platform/pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/deployment/lab/config/control-plane/config.devel.yaml; grep -nE "^[a-z_]+:\|policy_providers\|url:\|default:\|name:\|a... Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=412, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=1]: L=/home/javi/orca/workspaces/platform/pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/deployment/lab/config/control-plane/config.devel.yaml; sed -n 1,20p $L; sed -n 46,58p $L; sed -n 69,110p $L \| sed... Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=414, source=tool_result, line=39]: client_secret: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=414, source=tool_result, line=42]: generated_jws_hmac_secret: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=414, source=tool_result, line=45]: cas_robot_account_private_key_path: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=425, source=tool_result, line=19]: 19 password: '[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]', Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=47, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=1]: R=/home/javi/orca/workspaces/platform/pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/deployment/lab/config/backend/config.devel.yaml; cat -n $R \| sed -E 's/((secret\|token\|password\|key\|hmac)[a-z_]*: ... Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=101]: 101 # password: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=21]: 21 ui_server_token: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=44]: 44 chainloop_jws_hmac_secret: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=72]: 72 webhook_secret: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=74]: 74 secrets_backend:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=77]: 77 token: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=49, source=tool_result, line=78]: 78 secret_prefix: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=599, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=1]: B=/home/javi/orca/workspaces/platform/pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/backend; grep -n "sandbox:" -A 40 $B/configs/samples/config.yaml \| sed -E 's/((secret\|token\|password\|key\|api_key)... Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=601, source=tool_result, line=11]: 73- token: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=601, source=tool_result, line=3]: 65- api_key: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] … and 1 more — view all ↗
✅ Passed	`ai-config-mcp-servers-allowed`	`ai-coding-session-0ebed9`	-

🟡 83% — 100% AI — ⚠️ 1 policies failing

Oct 13, 2026 12:02 UTC · 74h33m37s · $131.50 · 2.9k in / 734.5k out · claude-code 2.1.296 (claude-opus-5-5)

_{View session details ↗}

Change Summary

Adds a signed sandbox-identity design around PR-attestation commit verification.
Reworks the spec, review replies, and PR flow across OSS and platform branches.
Runs targeted runner, SCM, biz, and jobs tests while iterating on review fixes.

AI Session Overall Score

🟡 83% — Well-aligned work, but planning and end-to-end confirmation stayed thinner than ideal.

AI Session Analysis Breakdown

🟢 92% · alignment

🟢 The sandbox-identity rescope was reflected in the spec and both PR reworks. · High Impact

🟢 90% · scope-discipline

No notes.

🟢 88% · solution-quality

🟢 AI recovered the lost platform commit by cherry-picking the original change. · High Impact

🟢 86% · user-trust-signal

No notes.

🟡 74% · verification

🟢 AI ran focused Go tests for runners, SCM, jobs, and biz code. · High Impact

🟠 Targeted suites ran, but no explicit end-to-end confirmation of the identity flow appears. · Medium Severity

💡 After major workflow changes, ask for one concrete end-to-end confirmation before treating the PR as verified.

🟡 68% · context-and-planning

🟠 Complex multi-repo rework proceeded without a shared visible plan or TODO baseline. · Medium Severity

💡 For multi-repo work, write a short visible plan before editing so later re-scopes have a shared baseline.

File Attribution

████████████████████ 100% AI / 0% Human

Status	Attribution	File	Lines
modified	ai	`backend/internal/biz/sandboxidentity_integration_test.go`	+248 / -2
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/chainloop_context_internal_test.go`	+142 / -4
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/chainlooptoken/minter.go`	+92 / -18
created	ai	`backend/internal/biz/sandboxidentity.go`	+95 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/prscan/task_test.go`	+45 / -41
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/runner.go`	+67 / -10
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/prscan/task.go`	+25 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/prscan/input.go`	+4 / -16
modified	ai	`backend/internal/biz/export_test.go`	+16 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/internal/biz/systemapitoken_integration_test.go`	+9 / -3
modified	ai	`backend/internal/biz/apitoken_test.go`	+9 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/tasks/task.go`	+8 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/internal/scm/github/commit_verifier.go`	+4 / -4
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/pr_scan.go`	+4 / -2
modified	ai	`backend/internal/scm/github/commit_verifier_test.go`	+3 / -3
modified	ai	`backend/internal/sandbox/chainlooptoken/minter_test.go`	+4 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/cmd/wire.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/biz/apitoken.go`	+3 / -0
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/ai_code_analysis.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/ai_scoring_processing.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/auto_assessment.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/auto_remediation.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/github_actions_scan.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/iac_scan.go`	+2 / -1
modified	ai	`backend/internal/jobs/sast_scan.go`	+2 / -1

…and 4 more file(s).

Policies (5, 1 failing)

Status	Policy	Material	Messages
⚠️ Failed	`ai-session-no-auto-pr`	`ai-coding-session-4503bd`	Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): ID=$(gh api repos/chainloop-dev/chainloop/pulls/3599/comments --jq '.[] \| select(.user.login=="cubic-dev-ai[bot]" and (.body \| test("VerificationStatusUnspecifi... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): ID=$(gh api repos/chainloop-dev/chainloop/pulls/3599/comments --jq '.[] \| select(.user.login=="cubic-dev-ai[bot]" and (.body \| test("os.LookupEnv"))) \| .id' \| h... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): cat > /tmp/claude-1000/-home-javi-orca-workspaces-platform-pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543/scratchpad/repl... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): cd /tmp/claude-1000/-home-javi-orca-workspaces-platform-pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543/scratchpad && gh a... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): cd ~/.cache/pfm-7678/spec-wt && gh pr create --repo chainloop-dev/platform --draft --base main --head PFM-7678-spec-sandbox-identity --title "spec: PFM-7678 Ver... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): cd ~/.cache/pfm-7678/spec-wt && git add docs/specs/PFM-7678-sandbox-identity.md && git commit -s -q -m "spec: say that the PFM-7678 identity is valid during the... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): cd ~/orca/workspaces/chainloop/pfm-7678-sandbox-commit-verification && gh pr create --repo chainloop-dev/chainloop --draft --base main --head pfm-7678-sandbox-c... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): gh api --method POST repos/chainloop-dev/platform/pulls/6875/comments/4266760571/replies -f body='Fixed in a645d9192. The control plane creates the workflow run... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): gh pr create --repo chainloop-dev/platform --draft --base main --head javier/pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in-the-built-in-pr --title "feat(pr-v... Pull request opened without human approval (auto-approved: source=config, reason=classifier): s=/tmp/claude-1000/-home-javi-orca-workspaces-platform-pfm-7678-record-commit-signature-verification-in/4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543/scratchpad; cat > $...
✅ Passed	`ai-config-ai-agents-allowed`	`ai-coding-session-4503bd`	-
✅ Passed	`ai-config-no-dangerous-commands`	`ai-coding-session-4503bd`	-
✅ Passed	`ai-config-no-secrets`	`ai-coding-session-4503bd`	-
✅ Passed	`ai-config-mcp-servers-allowed`	`ai-coding-session-4503bd`	-

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migmartri

I am confused about this PR, do you have a task for it?

javirln · 2026-10-13T13:34:09Z

@migmartri Yes, it is PFM-7678: https://linear.app/chainloop/issue/PFM-7678

The built-in PR attestation runs the CLI in the platform sandbox with the CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX runner. The sandbox gets no SCM token, so git.head never records the commit verification. A source-commit policy with check_author_verified fails on every built-in PR attestation.

The approved spec (chainloop-dev/platform#6821) makes the platform verify the commit with the clone credential before it starts the sandbox. Only the result goes into the sandbox, not the token.

This PR is the CLI half: the sandbox runner reads that result and records it only for the attested commit. The platform half is chainloop-dev/platform#6861, which waits for a release with this change. I added these links to the description.

The CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX runner gets no SCM token, so it cannot ask the provider whether the attested commit is signed. The platform can verify the commit before it starts the sandbox. The runner now reads that result from CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX_COMMIT_VERIFICATION and returns it only when its commit hash is the attested commit. A malformed value records the unavailable status. CommitVerification gets JSON tags, and its status encodes as a name, so the platform and the CLI share one format. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 0ebed99f-c817-4242-9a55-3c64202ac7f3

…tatus A given verification with no status, or with the unspecified status, carries no result. The runner now records the unavailable status for it, as it does for a value without a verification. Before, the attestation recorded the unspecified status. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543

The platform gives a signed identity token to each Chainloop sandbox that it spawns. The new sandboxidentity package defines the token and how to sign and verify it. The token is a JWT signed with a new key for each sandbox. The key has a short-lived certificate from the control plane CA, and the certificate chain is in the x5c header. The CA marks the certificate only for a caller with the dedicated permission (R-002). The token names the organization, the project, the workflow, the sandbox run and the Chainloop token of the sandbox, and it holds the commit verification with the full commit hash (R-003). It has no expiry of its own (D-013). Verify checks the chain against the trusted root of the control plane, the mark, the organization, the project and the workflow, that the time of signing is inside the certificate lifetime (D-007), and the signature. The Issuer helper lets the platform issue a token in one call. The signing request gets the sandbox_identity_issuer flag, and the attestation init request gets the sandbox_identity token. The verifier exports ValidateCertificate, so the identity and the attestation use the same certificate check. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543

The control plane now issues the certificates that sign a sandbox identity, and verifies and enforces the identity. - A new policy, PolicySandboxIdentityIssue, is the dedicated permission. No role holds it, and only a system API token can hold it (R-002, D-004). The signing service marks the certificate only for a caller that holds it. The CA writes the mark in the organizational unit of the subject (D-005). A CA that does not write the subject itself gives no marked certificate, and a mark that was not requested gives no certificate. - At attestation init, the control plane verifies the identity of a CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX run against its own CA, for the attested workflow, and only from the Chainloop token that the identity names (R-003, D-012). It records the identity on the workflow run, and tells the CLI the result. A token that does not verify is the same as no token (D-011). - When it stores an attestation of the sandbox runner, the control plane rejects an authenticated runner without a verified identity, and a commit verification that the identity does not hold (R-006, D-010). Other runners keep their behavior. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543

…tity The CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX runner reads the identity token from CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX_IDENTITY. At attestation init, the CLI sends the token to the control plane. When the control plane verified it, the CLI also verifies it against the trusted root of the control plane, in the same way as attestation verify. Only then is the runner authenticated (R-004), and only then does it return the commit verification of the identity, for the full hash of the attested commit (R-005). A token that does not verify, or a control plane that does not know the identity, gives a runner that is not authenticated and has no platform data. The CLI logs the reason (D-011). This replaces the unsigned hand-off in CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX_COMMIT_VERIFICATION and its "unavailable" status for an unreadable value. No released CLI reads that value. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543

Init loads the state that it wrote, and the load makes a new runner. A new CHAINLOOP_SANDBOX runner has no verified identity, so the runner info that init resolves next recorded authenticated=false, while git.head had the commit verification of the identity (R-004). Init now keeps its own runner when the runner can carry a verified identity. The other runners do not change. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543

…t verification The git.head subject also records the signature algorithm, and the renderer takes it from the commit verification first. When the identity holds a signature algorithm, the control plane now also requires the attestation to record the same one (R-006). When the identity has no algorithm, the attestation takes it from the signature of the commit, so the control plane does not compare it. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Javier Rodriguez <javier@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 4503bdcc-d428-4e05-ade6-966360bf5543

javirln requested a review from a team October 13, 2026 12:33

javirln marked this pull request as ready for review October 13, 2026 12:40

cubic-dev-ai Bot reviewed Oct 13, 2026

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Comment thread pkg/attestation/crafter/runners/chainloopsandbox.go Outdated

Comment thread pkg/attestation/crafter/runners/chainloopsandbox.go Outdated

migmartri requested changes Oct 13, 2026

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migmartri reviewed Oct 13, 2026

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Comment thread pkg/attestation/crafter/runners/chainloopsandbox.go Outdated

javirln marked this pull request as draft October 13, 2026 14:57

javirln added 5 commits October 16, 2026 15:19

javirln force-pushed the pfm-7678-sandbox-commit-verification branch from 2ee9aae to f907159 Compare October 16, 2026 13:55

javirln changed the title ~~feat(runners): record a given commit verification in the sandbox runner~~ feat(sandboxidentity): verify the identity of Chainloop sandboxes Oct 16, 2026

javirln added 2 commits October 16, 2026 16:15

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AI Session Checks — 🟡 85% · ⚠️ 3 failing

🟢 87% — 0% AI — ⚠️ 2 policies failing

Change Summary

AI Session Overall Score

AI Session Analysis Breakdown

🟢 93% · user-trust-signal

🟢 92% · alignment

🟢 88% · scope-discipline

🟢 88% · verification

🟢 86% · solution-quality

🟡 68% · context-and-planning

File Attribution

Policies (5, 2 failing)

🟡 83% — 100% AI — ⚠️ 1 policies failing

Change Summary

AI Session Overall Score

AI Session Analysis Breakdown

🟢 92% · alignment

🟢 90% · scope-discipline

🟢 88% · solution-quality

🟢 86% · user-trust-signal

🟡 74% · verification

🟡 68% · context-and-planning

File Attribution

Policies (5, 1 failing)

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javirln commented Oct 13, 2026

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javirln commented Oct 13, 2026 •

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